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REVIEW ESSAY
THE PROGRESSIVE DILEMMA
Neil Kinkopf*
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AND THE MEANINGS
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By Steven H. Shiffrin. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press,

1999. Pp. 220. $29.95.

TAKING THE

CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE

COURTS.

By Mark Tushnet. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press,

1999. Pp. 254. $29.95.
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE END OF CONSTITUTIONAUiSM?

American constitutionalism is in crisis. One of its central claims
is that constitutional interpretation is rational and neutral with respect to moral and political preferences. This claim has lost its credibility. In its most pointed form, the crisis undermines the legitimacy
of constitutionalism's most prominent institution, judicial review as

practiced in the Supreme Court.'
We have come to lack a persuasive case that the Court's decisions
are rational extrapolations of constitutional meaning as opposed to
impositions of the political and moral preferences of the individual
justices. If the Court's decisions are nothing more than unconstrained moral or political judgments, then judicial review substitutes
the political and moral judgments of unelected and democratically
unaccountable judges for the judgments of accountable officials and
institutions. Given the fundamental American commitment to demo*

Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. I wish to thank

David Barron, Victor FlattJohn Garvey, Mike Gerhardt, Kevin Lynch,Jeff Powell, and
Eric Segall for thoughtful comments and encouragement.
1 By judicial review, I mean the judiciary's power, in the setting of a case or
controversy, to interpret the Constitution and declare void legislation or other governmental action that is inconsistent with the Court's interpretation.
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cratic principles, a convincing explanaton of how judicial review, as
practiced in the Supreme Court, is harmonious with constitutional
principles is a necessary condition for understanding that institution's
legitimacy. I will refer to the current absence of such an account as
the legitimacy crisis.
The legitimacy crisis is increasingly acute for progressives. The
Rehnquist Court has repeatedly invoked both individual rights and
the provisions structuring the government in ways that protect and
promote conservative ends. It has done this under the headings of
federalism and separation of powers, 2 commercial speech, 3 the Takings Clause, 4 Equal Protection, 5 and the Due Process Clause. 6 Thus,
judicial review, which had been friendly to the progressive agenda
during the Warren and Burger Courts, has become deeply hostile to
that agenda. Not only has the Court ceased to be a promising forum
for securing progressive aims, it has become an obstacle to achieving
7
progressive ends through democratic processes.
This progressive dilemma is the culmination of the American
constitutional tradition.8 To appreciate the dilemma fully, we must
2 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that federalism prevents
Congress from affording a remedy for state violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (construing both federalism and separation of powers in striking down gun control legislation).
3 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
4 See, e.g., Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (deeming the Coal Act of
1992, which required mining companies to provide health care benefits to former
mine workers, a taking); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
5 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
6 See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (reversing award of punitive
damages).
7 The Rehnquist Court has been remarkably active in invalidating or narrowing
federal and state legislation on constitutional grounds. In addition to the cases cited
in supra notes 2-6, the Court has taken a crabbed view of Congress's enumerated
powers, especially under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, to invalidate legislation. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000)
(holding Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
is not appropriate legislation under Section 5 and so cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507 (striking down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, at least as applied to the states); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
549 (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
8 Drawing on the work of Alasdair Maclntyre, Professor H. Jefferson Powell has
offered a remarkable account of the American constitutional tradition. His account
powerfully illuminates the current legitimacy crisis. See H. JEFFERsON POWELL, THE
MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
(1993).
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first locate it within the tradition. American constitutionalism is
animated by a paradox that arises between two of its central claims.
On the one hand, "American constitutionalism came to claim... that
it embodies specific moral commitments ....

."9

On the other hand,

"it is autonomous with respect to moral argument and political preference (a claim that implicitly reinstates the Enlightenment assertion of
neutral rationality)."1 Until recently, constitutionalism has been able
to resolve this paradox. The tradition's current inability to resolve the
paradox is the source of its current crisis.
Historically, the tradition has been able to resolve its animating
paradox by acknowledging that it resolves moral and political issues
through a common law method, which checks againstjudges deciding
cases on the basis of naked moral or political preference. The common law method was understood as a distinct mode of rational inquiry
practiced by a professional elite that had acquired the discipline
through elaborate study, practice, and experience."
Despite confronting a number of crises, 12 this explanation was
ultimately successful in resolving each crisis that has preceded the current one. The crisis surrounding the Lochne74 3 era, for example, foreshadows the current crisis. In this period the Court developed a
doctrine of substantive due process, which read the Due Process
Clause to embody a strong notion of freedom of contracts. The Court
used the doctrine to invalidate a wide range of-usually progressivelegislation.
The Lochner crisis concerned whether the Court was legitimately
interpreting the Constitution, or rather was exceeding its role by substituting its own policy preferences for those of democratic institutions. The crisis came to a head during the Great Depression, when
the Court ruled many of the New Deal's most important programs
unconstitutional. The Court resolved the crisis by repudiating substantive due process. It took to heart concerns about antidemocratic
decision making and declared it generally would defer to the judgments of responsible political officials and institutions. The exceptional categories of cases, in which the Court would withhold
deference, were those where judicial review would be necessary to ensure participation and the proper functioning of democratic institu9 Id. at 49.
10 Id.
11 See id. at 74-86.
12 See id. at 119-32 (discussing the crisis
reconstruction).
13 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

of slavery,

secession,

and
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tions, set forth in the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene
14
Products Co.
The tradition plunged into its current crisis when the Court revived substantive due process, most clearly in Eisenstadt v. Baird.15 In
Eisenstadt,the Court addressed the validity of a state law that criminalized the provision of contraceptives to unmarried persons, which the
state defended as having been enacted on moral grounds. Although
the case was outside the categories of footnote four, the Court ruled
the statute unconstitutional based on its substantive moral judgment.' 6 The Court's decision in Roe v. Wade' 7 rested on similar reasoning and brought much broader attention to the re-emergence of
substantive due process.
The deployment of substantive moral and political reasoning has
been a hallmark of Supreme Court jurisprudence over the last three
decades. As with the Lochner crisis, the legal academy has responded
by challenging the legitimacy of judicial review on the now familiar
ground that judgments are a function of political preference rather
than the product of an independent tradition of legal reasoning. Indeed, these postmodernist critiques are skeptical of the possibility of a
coherent tradition of common law or legal method acting to check
the judicial imposition of political preferences. 18 To date, the tradition has not been able to formulate a response that persuasively establishes the legitimacy of judicial review. 19
Prior to the Rehnquist Court, the revitalized substantive due process typically favored the agenda of the political left. This fueled
something of a political backlash, with conservative politicians inveighing against judges who flout democratic principles and "legislate
from the bench." Republican presidents pronounced that they would
nominate judges who were committed to avoiding this error. The
Rehnquist Court comprises a substantial majority ofjustices who were
appointed by such presidents. Yet the current court has deepened the
post-Eisenstadt crisis. Its most stunning pronouncement came last
14 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally POWELL, supra note 8, at 142-73
(discussing the development of a "modem theory" of constitutional interpretation).
15 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
16 See POWELL, supra note 8, at 175-77.
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FArTH 50-51 (1988); MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE (1984). Not all of these critics speak the language of
postmodernism. See ROBERT BoRK,THE TEMPTING OF AMERIcA (1990).
19 This is not for lack of trying. Numerous leading constitutional theorists have
tried their hand at justifying judicial review, yet the crisis persists. See POWELL, supra
note 8, at 182-230 (reviewing the major attempts to construct a theory of legitimacy
and explaining how each fails).
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term in the FloridaPrepaidcases. 20 Through the Eisenstadtperiod, the
Court had consistently extolled the importance of deference to the
judgments of the political branches, even as its practice has strayed
from this ideal.2 1 In Norida Prepaid, the Court expressly refused to
defer to Congress's judgment. The opinion, dealing with patent stat23
utes22 and the Court's own evolving Eleventh Amendment doctrine,
acknowledges that Congress has the authority to legislate in the area
notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment and that Congress had
made a legislative record including findings of specific cases demonstrating the need for federal legislation. ChiefJustice Rehnquist simply disagreed with Congress's substantive judgment. In his view, the
record was not strong enough to justify the federal statutory protection.24 He concluded that the statute was inappropriate. The Court
thus dispensed with the obligatory incantation of deference and directly second-guessed Congress's political judgment. 25
The Rehnquist Court has in common with its immediate predecessors the willingness to substitute its own moral and political reasoning for those of democratic institutions and officials. It has
distinguished itself in terms of the political agenda it has served. In
area after area, the Rehnquist Court has interpreted the Constitution
to favor conservative interests. This deepens the current crisis by reinforcing the sense that the methods of the legal profession provide no
20 College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.

Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
21 In a number of recent cases running up to F/oridaPrepaid,the Court regretted
that it could not defer to Congress's judgment, because the Court (implausibly)
claimed to be unable to locate any relevant congressional judgment. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997) (decrying the lack of findings); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) (citing absence of support in the legislative record, even thoughJustice Breyer, in dissent, found voluminous supporting congressional documentation).
22 College Savings brought an infringement action against Florida Prepaid under
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (Supp. III 1997). College Savings relied on the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230
(1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a)), to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
23 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
24 See florida Prepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2208 (conceding that the record contains support for Congress's judgment, but dismissing this as providing only "little support"
insufficient to sustain the validity of Congress's enactment).
25 In response the leading academic doctrinalist and defender ofjudicial review,
Laurence Tribe, remarked, "Breathtaking!" 1 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI=U"IoNAL LAW 958 (3d ed. 1999).
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check at all against judges imposing their own moral or political
preferences.
The progressive dilemma is how to respond to the Rehnquist
Court, in light of the legitimacy crisis. There are two obvious alternatives. First, progressives might advocate doctrinal reforms that return
the Court to its friendly stance toward the progressive agenda. Second, progressives might abandon judicial review entirely. The first al26
ternative is pursued in a recent book by Professor Steven Shiffrin,
while the second alternative is advanced in a recent book by Professor
27
Mark Tushnet.
This Essay reviews the books of these important constitutional
scholars in turn and concludes that neither alternative is attractive.
The first alternative, doctrinal reform, is not a viable option without
an account of the doctrine's legitimacy. On the other hand, the case
for the legitimacy of abandoning judicial review is also troubled.
These books, taken together, define the progressive challenge: to articulate an account of the legitimacy ofjudicial review. While I do not
propose to produce such an account, I believe that Professors Shiffrin
and Tushnet provide some indications of what judicial review might
look like after an account of its legitimacy is fashioned.
II. THEsis: DOCTRINAL REFORM
In the debate over the value of constitutional rights, so lively
among scholars who locate themselves on the left, the First Amendment right of free speech is an important battleground. The Supreme
Court has elaborated a doctrine of free speech that emphasizes content neutrality, and that doctrine has yielded decisions that protect
powerful interests against meaningful governmental regulation. 28
These scholars then see the right of free speech as an obstacle to fundamental commitments such as meaningful equality and substantive
justice. The intramural debate leaves this point largely undisputed.
The battle lines are drawn over whether free speech doctrine might
nevertheless be reconceived and rendered worthy of the reverence
that many have accorded it.
26 STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999).
Professor Shiffrin does not undertake to reform all of constitutional doctrine. Instead, he focuses his project on the First Amendment freedom of speech. See id.
27

MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).

28 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999) (commercial speech); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996) (same); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating campaign finance
reform); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480 (1985) (same).
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Professor Steven Shiffrin's newest book, Dissent, Injustice, and the
Meanings ofAmerica (Dissent),29 comes down squarely in favor of doctrinal reform. He offers powerful criticisms of the Supreme Court's current free speech doctrine and advances an alternative vision of free
speech. In this, Dissent is a further elaboration of the project Shiffrin
undertook in his acclaimed The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance (Romance).3° As Professor Shiffrin puts it,

In [Romance], I argued that dissent should be at the center of an
appropriate theory of free speech. In this book, I return to that
perspective, but I emphasize two of the social functions of dissent:
its place in cultural struggles about the meanings of America and its
role in combating injustice. With this emphasis, I hope to make the
case for dissent's special role more3 attractive in terms of both constitutional law and political theory. '
In Romance, Shiffrin sought to offer a romantic reading of the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. That reading yields two major prescriptions: one methodological and the other substantive.
Methodologically, Shiffrin advocates an eclectic approach to First
Amendment decision making.3 2 Substantively, dissent is an important
First Amendment value.
Shiffrin's methodological and substantive prescriptions follow
from his version of romanticism as emphasizing
the passions against abstract reason; the subjective against the objective; the concrete and the particular against the general and the
universal; activity, dynamism, and movement against the frozen,
29

See SHnwuN, supra note 26.
STEVEN SmuRnuN, THE Fmsr AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND RoMANcE (1990).
31 Id. at xi. This description of Romance may come as a surprise to readers of that
book. In Romance, Shiffrin specifically rejects any "centered" approach to free speech.
Instead he advocates eclecticism as a First Amendment methodology, drawing on his
version of a romantic tradition. (Shiffiin asserts that there are numerous romantic
traditions, "a pluralism of romanticisms." Id at 141.) To Shiffrin, this eclecticism
means that no value can claim to be at the center of the First Amendment. Rather,
the First Amendment embodies many values, and those values must all be weighed in
making a First Amendment decision. Although Romance plainly regards dissent as a
critical and unappreciated value, Shiffiin's reference to a dissent-centered approach
to the First Amendment is incongruous. Moreover, because Shiffrin's romanticism
means that the list of First Amendment values cannot be limited, it is far from clear
what Shiffrin means when he accords dissent a "special role."
32 See id. at 132-39. Shiffrin is usually ambiguous about the identity of these decision makers. The courts are but one First Amendment decision maker. Congress, the
President, the Attorney General, and the Federal Communications Commission are
important examples of other decision makers, but it is not clear whether Shiffrin
means to include them or whether he takes a view ofjudicial supremacy that renders
non-judicial decision making uninteresting. This ambiguity persists in Dissent.

30
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static, and eternal; creativity, originality, imagination, and spontaneity against mechanical calculation, rote analysis, or artificial bloodless routine; invention over discovery; and struggle over victoryA33
This articulation of romanticism is grounded in the work of Ralph
Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman.3 4 As this description indicates,
Shiffrin's romanticism not only defies but also rejects clear definition
and limitation. True to these romantic commitments, Shiffrin's project defies categorization or easy summary. A fair synopsis of the project, then, cannot avoid being lengthier and more labored than is
customary in the lawjournals. I will endeavor first to give an accurate
description and then proceed to set forth my major criticisms in a
separate subsection.
A.

Romance and Dissent

Professor Shiffrin rejects the possibility of a single, general theory
in favor of eclecticism as the preferred methodology for construing
the Free Speech Clause. This method is a highly refined form of balancing that calls upon decision makers to consider all relevant social,
individual, and governmental interests and values implicated by the
decision and to balance them not according to an abstract weight but
rather according to how strongly or weakly a given interest is implicated in the specific controversy. Shiffrin describes this eclecticism as
a "contextualized approach" that is "pragmatic, pluralistic, and
nonreducive."3 5 He rejects the contention that eclecticism is completely unrestrained, though he admits-repeatedly-that it is "capacious." 36 While capacious, the eclectic method would still demand

that decision makers render judgments that contend with and can
plausibly be evaluated against whether they "fit with sources of inter37
pretation such as language, intent, precedent, policy, and power."
Thus, Shiffrin concludes that the eclectic approach imposes some limitations, admittedly loose or "wildly capacious," on the ability of decision makers to impose their brute preferences under the guise of free
38
speech decision making.
33 Id. at 141 (footnote omitted). Shiffrin amplifies this understanding of romanticism with a quote from Isaiah Berlin: "[T]he romantics stand for the 'celebration of
all forms of defiance directed against the .. .static and the accepted and [for] the
value placed on minorities... as such, no matter what the ideal for which they suffer.'" Id. (second and third alterations in original).
34 Id. at 72-86.
35 Id. at 133 (citations omitted).
36 Id. at 138.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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There is a symbiotic relationship between romanticism and eclecticism. Eclectic methodology lends strong symbolic support to romanticism.3 9 When decision makers utilize an eclectic method to resolve
free speech concerns, they emphasize the particular and the concrete
over the general and the universal. To use this method, then, is to
adopt, at least in this setting, Shiffrin's version of romanticism.
In turn, the eclectic method derives meaning from romanticism.
Given Shiffrin's description of eclecticism as capacious and openended, it is not hard to imagine it falling into utter indeterminacy,
barely a mask for the ad hoc imposition of a decision maker's individual preferences. By emphasizing passions, invention, and spontaneity
over reason, order, and continuity, romanticism affords some check
against the eclectic method succumbing to this fate. That is, romanticism provides some content and so marks at least broad parameters of
eclectic decision making. It offers a measure of guidance for determining the weight to accord the various competing interests that eclecticism seeks to balance. Emphasizing the interdependence of these
concepts, Shiffrin ultimately takes to referring to his innovation as "romantic eclecticism." 40
Shiffrin's version of romanticism also drives his major substantive
prescription. He argues that the Free Speech Clause should be understood to establish dissent as a distinct and important value. 41 In keeping with his version of romantic eclecticism, Shiffrin declines to offer a
definition of dissent. Instead, he offers that "the analysis of dissent
and its value will often be specific to diverse factual contexts and... it
is likely that the perspectives associated with dissent will best be defined in the hard and continuing struggle of case-by-case adjudication."4 2 Nevertheless, Romance clearly understands dissent to include
challenges to existing authority, power arrangements, morals, and so39 Indeed, this appears to be the primary reason that Shiffrin advocates eclecticism. Methodology standing alone strikes Shiffrin as entirely irrelevant.
[T]he problem with First Amendment decisionmaking is for the most part
not with the method employed but with the values held by the decision makers. The path to first amendment safety lies not in the imposition of a particular method, but in a genuine cultural commitment to substantive first
amendment values. If that commitment is not present, no "binding"
method will hold. If that commitment exists, method will take care of itself.
Id at 110. Shiffrin, nevertheless, sees great symbolic importance in methodology.

Because rhetoric matters, the method that decision makers use to justify their judgments and actions has a powerful effect on whether "a genuine cultural commitment
to substantive first amendment values" will develop. Id. at 110-11.
40 Id. at 139.
41 See id. at 108-09.
42 Id. at 107-08.
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cial conventions. This obviously advances the cause of romanticism.
Understanding dissent as an important constitutional value will favor
invention, struggle, and dynamism over order and continuity. 43
Shiffrin also offers an argument from democracy in favor of his
view of dissent as a distinct and important free speech value. He repeatedly asserts that the Free Speech Clause is popularly understood
to value dissent. 44 He then goes further, contending that dissent is an
indispensable component of the structure of American democracy.
"Whether American democracy depends upon genuine majority rule
is open to debate, he explains, but American democracy would not
45
exist in the absence of a commitment to safeguarding dissent."
Shiffrin's two prescriptions, that romantic eclecticism is the appropriate method for free speech decision making and that dissent is
a distinct and important free speech value, are subordinate and instrumental to Shiffrin's ultimate project: promoting romanticism. 4 6 From
the perspective of the progressive audience for which Shiffrin is writing, romanticism will redeem the Free Speech Clause, by allowing it to
43 Shiffrin also contends that a focus on dissent will preserve the other values that
have been associated with the constitutional right of free speech, such as "liberty, ....
equality, justice, tolerance, respect, dignity, self-government, [the search for]
truth ....associational values, and cathar[sis]." Id. at 167. Regrettably, Shiffrin does
not explain how dissent-as opposed to his eclectic methodology-will preserve these
values. It is difficult to see how a focus on dissent would preserve the value of selfgovernment, for example. Early in Romance, Shiffrin recounts the case of Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See SHIFFRIN, supra note 30, at 74-80. In thumbnail,
Myers was a disgruntled local assistant prosecutor who voiced her frustration with her
superiors and distributed a questionnaire to her coworkers concerning office policies.
See id. at 75. Calling Myers's action a mini-insurrection, the local prosecutor, Harry
Connick Sr., fired her. See id. Myers claimed that her termination violated her First
Amendment right of free speech. The Supreme Court disagreed, drawing Shiffrin's
lamentation. Id. Had the Supreme Court focused on promoting the value of dissent
and ruled in Myers's favor, how would that have preserved the value of self-government? To be sure, an eclectic approach to deciding the case would have called upon
the Court to consider both the value of dissent and the value of effective self-government. Once dissent is accepted as the focal value of free speech, as advocated in
Dissent, the conclusion that other values, like self-government, are diminished is unavoidable. If they are "liquidated," that is not because of anything about the value of
dissent, but rather a function of eclecticism.
44 Id. at 157.
45 Id. at 72.
46 For a discussion of the place of method in Shiffrin's scheme, see supranote 39.
As to dissent, Shiffrin believes that "courts [and] commentators... would best serve
the interests of the country by associating the first amendment with the metaphor of
dissent, with dissenters and the dissent value." SHIFFN, supra note 30, at 169. He
recognizes, however, that the concept of dissent may become "twisted and distorted"
over time and so considers it "a potentially temporary romance." Id. at 168.
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play an affirmative role in achieving substantive justice. Romanticism's redemptive capacity stems from the emphasis it places on how
humans flourish. "[T]he concept of human flourishing (or something like it) must be an important part of human decision making." 47
Shiffrin realizes that this focus will yield arguments about competing conceptions of the good, of what represents and what will advance
"human flourishing." Rather than seeing the choice between competing conceptions of the good as incoherent, he regards it as inevitable.
"What would be incoherent would be ... to suppose that the state
48
could do anything other than make a decision about the issue."
Thus, Shiffrin argues that the state may adopt conceptions of substantive justice and meaningful equality and seek to advance those conceptions through a variety of programs including compulsory public
education. 49 The Free Speech Clause, far from being an obstacle to a
progressive agenda, is properly understood as a vehicle for that
agenda because of both the particular results yielded and because of
the symbolic effects. Specifically, by applying a romantic eclecticism
that is concerned with dissent and human flourishing to speech-related decision making, the Free Speech Clause will not be a ground
for invalidating or opposing important particulars of the progressive
agenda. Moreover, the Free Speech Clause, having received a construction that extols the value of dissent and the essentials of human
flourishing, will stand as a powerful symbol of affirmation of fundamental progressive values.
Romance left key concepts, such as dissent, undefined and gave no
clear indication as to what exactly would result from applying romantic eclecticism to actual controversies or from pursuing its romantic
vision generally. Dissent, Injustice and the Meanings of America responds
to some of these shortfalls and concludes with a program to encourage dissent.
According to Dissent, the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause
should be understood not only to protect dissent but affirmatively to
encourage it. Shiffrin defines "dissent" to "mean speech that criticizes
existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities."5 0 As it
47 Id. at 165.
48 Id. at 166.
49 See id. at 88-90 & 216-17 n.15. Shiffrin is not untroubled about this prescription. He admits that "the whole notion of government's providing an authoritative
rendition of public morality is democratically problematic." Id. at 84. Nevertheless,

public education must choose some subjects to cover and others to leave out. Shiffrin
offers the uncontroversial examples of astrology and phrenology. See id. at 89. He
dodges the obvious and difficult controversy surrounding creationism and evolution.

50 SIImN, supra note 26, at xi.

1504

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 75:4

turns out, however, not all speech that criticizes existing norms is
properly labeled dissent. Consider, for example, tobacco advertising.
At first blush this appears fully to fit Shiffrin's definition of dissent. It
often challenges dominant views regarding smoking and responds to
governmental regulation of tobacco products and the practice of
smoking. Shiffrin concedes that "tobacco advertising has some elements of dissent," but he argues that it does not deserve the full protection that he would accord to "classic" dissent because it
misses vital elements ordinarily associated with our valuing dissent.
Tobacco advertising is not an instance of the rebel, the maverick, or
a social movement striking out against the current. It is an instance
of the powerful influencing the market rather than one of dissent
by the less powerful. Tobacco advertising is no part of a social practice that challenges unjust hierarchies with the prospect of promot51
ing progressive change.
Thus, for speech to be considered fully valued dissent, it must not only
meet the definition. It must also be speech by a "less powerful" "rebel,
maverick or social movement and be intended to challenge not any
prevailing norm, but an "unjust" norm.
Shiffrin is by no means alone in contending that there is a central
value of the constitutional right of free speech. Other contenders for
53
52
the title include the marketplace of ideas, toleration, self-govern54
5
5
ment, and self-realization.
Less common is Shiffrin's willingness,

expressed in his eclecticism, to accord weight to other values. 56 While
Shiffrin will allow consideration of other factors, he places the focus of
free speech analysis on dissent. He begins his examination of dissent's place in free speech analysis with a discussion of the flag-buming controversy. 57 Flag-burning represents "classic dissent" and so
deserves to be seen as resting at the heart of the constitutional freedom of speech. For Shiffrin, the inability of competing free speech

See id. at xii; see also SHIFFRIN, supra note 30, at 153.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SocIETY (1986).
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT (1948).
55 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REv. 964 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591
(1982).
56 Other theories purport to be the sole, unifying consideration. See, e.g.,
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 54.
57 See SHIFFRiN, supra note 26, at 11.
51
52
53
54
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models to provide a powerful rationale for protecting flag-burning
58
demonstrates the defects of those models.
Having examined the dissent model in light of what lies at its
core, Shiffrin next extols the dissent model's virtues by explaining
what rests largely outside its protection: commercial speech.5 9 The
content neutrality model, which presently dominates the Supreme
Court's free speech doctrine, is peculiarly unable to justify deference
to regulation of commercial speech. 60 To command that the government treat speech of all types equally (other than speech falling
within an exception) is to prohibit special regulation of non-excepted
speech. 61 The content-neutrality model, then, can only defer to regulation of commercial speech if it is analogous to obscenity and the
other recognized forms of low value speech. As the Supreme Court
has placed increasing doctrinal reliance on this model, it finds itself
on the verge of applying strict scrutiny to commercial speech
62
regulations.
Shiffrin cannot abide any free speech model that places value on
commercial speech. Not only does the Free Speech Clause not afford
protection to commercial speech, a proper understanding of free
speech affirmatively supports progressive commercial speech regulations. As he puts it,
[W] e can... suppose that the private allocation of resources is part
of public decision making in a democracy. We should further notice, however, that government allocation of resources is also part of
public decision making in a democracy. That one predominates
over the other (for many wealthy corporations, of course, free enterprise is the exception, not the rule) seems quite beside the point.
Even if we suppose that commercial advertising is political, protec58 See id. at 11-18.
59 See id. at 32-48.
60 This model of free speech prohibits the government from regulating speech
on the basis of its content. Regulation of speech on the basis of its content is permissible only when the government can articulate a compelling interest that the regulation
advances and show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to advancing that compelling interest. While there are regulations that have satisfied this test, they are extremely rare. For an example of a regulation of speech that passes strict scrutiny, see
Austin v. Michigan Chamberof Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). In addition, the content
neutrality model makes exceptions for certain forms of low value speech, such as obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), fighting words, see Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), and defamatory statements, see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61 A caveat must be observed for regulations that can withstand strict scrutiny.
62 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); SHMRW,
supra note 26, at 32-48.
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tion of "political speech" in this context seems dramatically less important than in others if all that is at stake is the efficient allocation
of resources. Moreover, since government frequently departs from
free enterprise with constitutional blessing, perhaps the proper allocation of resources as seen by the market should not be privileged
after all.

63

Next, Shiffrin takes up the issue of racist speech.r He begins by
offering a doctrinal critique of the Supreme Court's content-neutrality
approach to this matter as articulated by Justice Antonin Scalia in his
opinion for the Court in RA. V. v. City of St. Paul,65 where the Court
struck down a Minneapolis hate-speech ordinance. His major objections to content-neutrality as a model of free speech are by now familiar, although anyone interested in this aspect of the Court's doctrine
66
would benefit from Shiffrin's penetrating analysis of RA.V.
But Shiffrin is hunting much bigger game. He is less concerned
with whether the Court has applied the content-neutrality model coherently than with the "meaning of America" that the model advances. The issue of racist speech affords a vehicle to describe the
meaning of America that informs the model of content neutrality and
serves as an opportunity to hold this story against the meaning of
America that informs the dissent model. Shiffrin aptly summarizes
the "vision of America" that underlies the content-neutrality model:
America [is] a nation that spurns paternalism and tolerates different points of view, however hateful. It is a nation that is formally
neutral in race relations (affirmative action programs, from [this]
perspective, are undesirable), ideally neutral in the economic market (although the Constitution does not guarantee this), and neutral in the "marketplace of ideas." Of course, government will
engage in programs that have differential impacts on groups and
67
ideas, but substantive equality is not the goal of the Constitution.
63 SHIFRN, supranote 26, at 40. Shiffrin then considers Cass Sunstein's application of civic republicanism to free speech. See id. at 42-48. In thumbnail, Sunstein
argues that deliberation on public issues is at the core of the right of free speech.
Thus, regulations of political speech should be subject to exacting scrutiny unless
designed to promote deliberation on a public issue. So, for example, campaign finance regulation should be subject to a relatively deferential standard of review. Shiffrin argues that the vision of an engaged and deliberative public that watches public
affairs programming instead of sitcoms is so unrealistic that it cannot provide a plausible model of free speech. See id.
64 See id. at 49-57.
65 505 U.S. 377 (1992).

66

See SHIE-RIN, supra note 26, at 51-63.

67

Id. at 64.
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This vision undeniably embraces deeply rooted values, such as
tolerance and a distrust of governmental paternalism. Shiffrin recognizes the strong purchase this vision has on America's self-conception.68 Nevertheless, he prefers an alternative meaning of America:
"[T]he First Amendment's major purpose and function in the American polity is to protect and sometimes affirmatively to sponsor the individualism, the rebelliousness, the antiauthoritarianism, the spirit of
nonconformity within us all." 69 Thus, the dissent model would permit
regulations, such as the one at issue in RA.V., that criminalize racist
speech but not other forms of fighting words. Shiffrin would go further and embrace viewpoint discrimination. Specifically, his dissent
model would allow proscription of racist speech that is targeted
against individual members of groups that are historically oppressed
because of race, ethnicity, or national origin. 7° He defines this cate71
gory by the individuals it excludes: "non-Jewish white Americans."
The justification for this viewpoint distinction rests largely in the history of slavery and racial oppression in this country, which supports
the conclusion that this particular category of racist speech is peculiarly harmfil and chilling.7 2 It also stems from "[r]ecall[ing] that
one of the minimum conditions of a legitimate system is that it as73
sumes that all citizens are worthy of equal concern and respect"

Given this "major premise on which the polity is constituted," 74 a racist speaker is estopped from claiming constitutional protection for
the right to claim that others should not be treated with equal dignity
and respect.
Next Shiffrin turns to injustice, introducing the discussion by
considering an epistemological problem with the marketplace of ideas
model of the First Amendment. 75 Different marketplaces (or socie68 See id.
69 Id. at 76.
70 See id. at 75-76, 161-63 & n.161.
71 Id. at 75.
72 See, e.g., id. at 76-77.
73 Id. at 78.
74 See id. at 79. While Shiffrin clearly accepts that this proposal would be permissible under the dissent model, he is conflicted as to whether it would, as a matter of
policy, do more good than harm and so does not specifically call for its enactment.
See id. at 80-86.

75 This model has deep roots in Anglo-American thought. See, e.g., JoIH

STUART

MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1951);
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGmCA (Noel Douglas ed., 1927). It asserts that there should be

no prohibition on the expression of any idea. Informed by an Enlightenment age
confidence in human reason, and cautioned by attempts to enforce official but erroneous orthodoxy, this model postulates that, by allowing a free and robust market-
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ties) yield different and sometimes precisely opposite truths. What individuals accept as true, then, depends upon the society in which they
live. 7 6 The lesson he draws from this observation is that "persons in

power" have the human capacity for self-deception-to believe that
what is in their interest is true. As a result, power is deployed in selfinterested ways even if the person exercising the power does not realize it. We are reassured not to despair: "there is no such thing as a
perfectly just society.... This is not a prescription for hopeless abdication; injustice may never be completely eradicated but some societies are more just than others. It is always possible to move toward a
77
better society."
Dissent is the key to optimism. As Shiffrin puts it,
[D]issent is indispensable. Without it, unjust hierarchies would
surely flourish with little possibility of constructive change. If the
truth about the presence of injustice is to be spread, social institutions must be constructed in a way that nurtures critical speech.
In the end, the premises of the argument are quite simple. Injustice exists; the impulse to resist it is less than it should be; dissent
78
should be encouraged.
Thus, the constitutional freedom of speech does not guarantee justice, but it guarantees an opportunity to identify and oppose injustice-that is, an opportunity to dissent.
While it may not yet be time to despair, the extent to which dissent has been marginalized is cause enough for Shiffrin to lament.
One glaring source of lament is the media. The media respond to
advertisers. Ads are sexist, promote hedonism and materialism, and
carry the overall theme that "all is right with the world." As to entertainment programming, advertisers demand that shows be mindlessly riveting by using continuous violence and gratuitous sex.
Advertisers also require the networks to cater to eighteen to thirty-fiveyear-olds and push newspapers and magazines to focus on the
79
wealthy.
place in which opposing ideas are expressed, error will be exposed and the truth will

out. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
76

This presentation of the idea that "truth" is socially constructed is in some
SHIFFRIN, supra note 26, at 27-31 (rejecting
postmodernist approaches to free speech).

tension with an earlier discussion. See
77
78

Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 93. Shiffrin contends for spreading "the truth about the presence of

injustice" without a hint of irony over having just raised a serious question about

whether truth is a notion with any coherence.
79 Id. at 97-101.

2000]

THE PROGRESSIVE DILEMMA

1509

News reporting, according to Shiffrin, is no less bleak. Coverage
excludes issues that progressives care about, such as wealth distribution, the extent of corporate power, and the "inferior position" of women and minorities. Political analysis focuses on questions of strategy
and prognostication rather than substance. Foreign affairs reporting
tends to parrot the line of American foreign policy and fails to accurately and fully report the point of view in other countries except in
rare cases. Generally, media reporting fails to challenge the status
quo and, in fact, serves mainly to perpetuate it.80
The media is by no means alone; the Court has played a co-starring role in the marginalization of dissent. Shiffrin commends the
Court for constructing meaningful protections against libel and slander actions for those who criticize government officials. 8 ' But the
Court has not extended those protections to a sufficiently broad range
of public figures. As a result, it is comparatively difficult to express
dissent against the actions of powerful non-governmental officials.
The Court has also left in place serious institutional barriers to effective dissent. With judicial blessing, dissenters are denied access to
"prisons, post offices, [Lafayette Park] across from the White House,
school mailboxes and private mailboxes, utility poles and polling
82
booths, airports, county fairs, and shopping centers."
The Supreme Court's decision invalidating much of the 1974
campaign finance reform law deserves special attention.8 3 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA) placed limits on the
amount of money candidates for federal office could spend on their
campaigns.8 4 One rationale the government proferred was to make
campaigns more egalitarian and democratic. Recognizing that relative spending levels strongly correlate with success in federal election
campaigns, spending limits would allow more candidates representing
a broader array of positions to present their candidacies competitively.8 5 The Court held this motive to be forbidden. "[T] he concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment ....
,,86 Shiffrin responds with a question:
"[W] hy is it 'wholly foreign to the First Amendment' for Congress to
80 Id. at 101-07.
81 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
82 See Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 110-11.
83 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
84 See 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1) (Supp. IV 1970) (expenditures from personal
funds); id. § 608(c) (campaign expenditures).
85 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56-57.
86

Id. at 22.
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take measures limiting injustice in the democratic system?"8 7 Certainly, he posits, the FECA offered the possibility of promoting dis88
senting positions.
Shiffrin offers a four point program for redressing the marginalization of dissent. The four points are (1) education that promotes
dissent against injustice, (2) access to the media for dissenting viewpoints, (3) lowered legal barriers to dissent, and (4) providing dissenters with access to information. 9 The program is meant to be an
outline and so lacks specifics, but it offers at least some content.
As to education, schools should teach substantive concepts ofjustice. This will provide the basis on which students will ultimately be
able to dissent against injustice. In this vein, students should be
taught to dissent-to be prepared to reject dominant conventionsand should be taught to think of dissent as appropriate behavior for
virtuous citizens. 90
Given the important role that the mass media play in American
life, Shiffrin argues that meaningful dissent requires that dissenters
have improved access to the media.9 1 His specific proposals include
requiring television broadcasters to air educational programming for
a portion of each day and to authorize the National Education Association to declare what programming is educational. 9 2 He would also
87

SHIFFRIN,

supra note 26, at 112.

88 It is by no means clear that this would have been the result. It may be that
unseating the status quo, which is to say incumbents, requires that opponents be able
to spend amounts in excess of the legislated caps. If so, the legislation would have
functioned to prevent effective dissent and to protect incumbents and the status quo.
Because the FECA never emerged from its cradle, it is speculative to regard the legislation as promoting or restraining dissent. On the other hand, Shiffrin is correct in
reading Buckley to reject the idea that promoting dissent is an important constitutional value, let alone the central value of the Free Speech Clause.
89 See id. at 112-13.
90 See id. at 113. Shiffrin argues,
[I] t is important to communicate the importance of constitutional values. If
our citizens are not educated with a sense of justice, they are less likely to
acquire it. Indeed, a sense ofjustice and of injustice is typically a prerequisite for progressive dissent. In addition, our educational system must educate not only autonomous thinkers prepared to reject the habits, customs,
and traditions of the larger society but also citizens who generally regard
dissent against injustice as virtuous behavior.

Id.
91 In this section, Shiffrin refers repeatedly to "the media," but he specifically
discusses only one medium, broadcast television. Id. at 115-17. In a concluding paragraph he argues for "access to the sites of injustice." Id. at 117. By this, he means
access to both private and public property for the purpose of holding demonstrations.
92 See id. at 115-16.
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apply the fairness doctrine to commercial advertising, allowing free
access for those who dissent from the commercial messages. 9 3 Finally,
Shiffrin proposes granting free access to broadcasting facilities to all
candidates on the ballot.94 In a later section he adds that campaign

finance reform should include restrictions on spending by candidates
95
and adoption of proportional representation.
In addition to this affirmative support for dissent, Shiffrin seeks
to minimize disincentives to dissent. His primary concern is with the
possibility of defamation actions being brought against dissenters.
The treatment of dissent against public officials, where First Amendment doctrine is sweepingly protective of the dissenter, 9 6 is satisfactory. Shiffrin calls for this protection to be extended to dissenting
speech made against any public figure, and he suggests that this category be defined in reference to "the extent to which the criticized
97
individual exercises power."
Finally, access to information will encourage dissent and make
dissent more effective. Accordingly, Shiffrin urges greater public access to information to foster "a responsible citizenry prepared to challenge injustice when appropriate." 98 He calls for greater subsidies for
93 This proposal raises obvious and perhaps insuperable practical problems. For
example, how does one determine who is entitled to respond? Consider an advertisement for clothing. Would the television station accord response time to a group that
opposes sweatshop conditions in the apparel industry, to one that opposes the exploitation of child labor, or to unions whose members have lost jobs as operations
have moved overseas? Shiffrin spends two sentences discussing this proposal and so
does not begin to suggest how such a plan could ever work. See id at 116.
94 Shiffrin again fails to offer any sense of how this proposal could work. For
example, it is not difficult to imagine "candidates" coming out of the woodwork simply to receive free air time. See id. at 116-17.
95 See id. at 120. Again, Shiffrin simply lists the ideas without elaboration. He
does not explore any of the complexity of the blunderbusses he offers. For example,
he contends that by imposing spending limits on candidates and making available
public funding for much of what candidates may spend, candidates will be freed from
moneyed interests. See id. This is far from obvious. The advent of independent advertising campaigns, funded and produced directly and independently by moneyed
interests, means that candidates no longer rely on moneyed interests exclusively for
contributions. The National Rifle Association, industry organizations, and labor unions have all funded massive advertising and get-out-the-vote campaigns that have directly served the political agenda of specific parties and candidates. By reducing the
amount a candidate can spend, Shiffrin's proposal may make candidates more reliant
on such special interests by diminishing their ability to control the agenda of their
own campaigns.

96

See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

97 SuvmuN, supra note 26, at 117.
98 Id. at 118. Shiffrin commits precisely the error that formed the basis of his
critique of civic republicanism. Shiffrin rejects civic republicanism because it rests on
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education and libraries and for equitable access to the "new communications infrastructure." 9 9 He proposes that all magazines and publications be subsidized. 10 0 These subsidies would be financed through
a tax on advertising revenue in order to give the media greater incentive to look to its circulation for revenue.
B.

Analysis

Insofar as Shiffrin aims to reform the substance and method of
thejudiciary's constitutional doctrine, 10 1 his project is unlikely to convince even those who share his romantic and progressive commitments. First, his major substantive proposal-that the central
meaning of the Free Speech Clause be understood as the protection
and encouragement of dissent-would likely diminish dissent. The
effectiveness and meaning of dissent depends upon its being socially
disapproved, if not illegal. Consider Shiffrin's paradigmatic case, flag
a deliberative conception of the public in which citizens act responsibly and pay close
attention to public affairs. Shiffrin derides this view, doubting that the public is unlikely to stop watching sitcoms in order to start watching PBS. Id. at 44-45. But why
does Shiffrin think the public will suddenly tune in to his educational programming
or become "responsible" and eager to "challenge injustice"? This is every bit as "pollyanna" as civic republicanism's mythologized notions of the people. See supra note 63.
99 Id. at 118. Shiffrin does not say what this new infrastructure is. If he means
the internet, he does not express what "equitable access" would mean or how the
existing regime is inequitable. Indeed, it is odd that nowhere in the entire book is the
internet discussed. Many of the power relations that Shiffrin decries, particularly
those relating to print and broadcast media, are subject to serious rearrangement by
emerging technologies. Exactly what this portends is not presently clear, but these
technological forces may be just as significant to the ability of citizens to protest injustice and the future place of dissent in American culture than the items on Shiffrin's
agenda.
100 Shiffrin explains why all publications should be subsidized even though his
overall program is designed to promote dissent: "To be sure, not all magazines or
nonprofit organizations challenge injustice, but ad hoc determination of which do
and which do not challenge injustice would be intolerable." Id. at 118-19. At this
point in the book, this is a breathtaking concession. First, this is an excellent statement of the position of content neutrality, the very doctrine Shiffrin means to supplant. Second, Shiffrin has repeatedly made, and called upon courts and legislatures
to make, exactly such ad hoc determinations of what does and does not constitute
dissent. If such judgments are intolerable, Shiffrin must abandon his entire project.
101 Here it is regrettable that Shiffrin never clearly denominates the institution
that is to author any of his proposals. For some, such as campaign finance reform, he
must be understood to be calling for legislative action and a change in judicial doctrine only to regard the legislation to be constitutionally permissible. The source of
others, such as "access to the sites of injustice," is ambiguous. Because these legislative or political reforms are typically presented in such cursory fashion, I do not propose to analyze them beyond the questions raised in the footnotes above.
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burning.10 2 If flag-burning is not only protected but respected and
encouraged as a core constitutional value, then burning an American
flag ceases to function as a powerful way of protesting injustice within
American society. Those who burn the flag seek to engage in a form
of protest that is antithetical to prevailing norms and that is, in a
sense, shocking.' 0 3 Shiffrin's own reading of Ralph Waldo Emerson
and Walt Whitman underscores this point. They "celebrated the courage of the nonconformist, the iconoclast, the dissenter." 0 4 In Shiffrin's conception of the Free Speech Clause, dissent ceases to be an
act of courage and becomes a matter of responsible citizenship and
represents conformity as much as protest. Infused with responsibility
and conformity, dissent is fundamentally altered and would be, at
best, a flawed vehicle for pursuing Shiffrin's project.
Second, many who share Shiffrin's romantic and progressive
commitments have well-founded objections to placing any reliance on
the courts to achieve their agenda. In a recent book, 0 5 Richard Rorty
sets forth some of these concerns. Judges and lawyers are ill-suited to
applying a romantic eclecticism designed to promote the conditions
of human flourishing. As Rorty puts it, "Inspirational value is typically
not produced by the operations of a method, a science, a discipline,
or a profession. It is produced by the individual brushstrokes of un10 6
professional prophets and demiurges."
History is also a source of caution. Except for the interval of the
Warren and Burger Courts, the Supreme Court has rarely been
friendly and has frequently been hostile to the progressive agenda,
repeatedly striking down legislation that progressives were able to enact. By the early 1900s, the heirs to Emerson and Whitman had
clearly "devalu[ed] (then-) 'prevailing constitutionalist, legalistic and
party-electoral expressions of citizenship.' These criticisms helped
substitute a rhetoric of fraternity and national solidarity for a rhetoric
of individual rights and this new rhetoric was ubiquitous on the Left
102 See Shiffrin, supra note 26, at 11-18.
103

For a somewhat stronger version of this argument, see John Hart Ely, FlagDese-

cration:A Case Study in Theories of Categorization & Balancingin FirstAmendment Analysis,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1489-90 (1975) (contending that the effectiveness of burning
one's draft card as a form of protest against the Vietnam War rested upon the act

being illegal). One reason offered in opposition to attempts to criminalize flag burning (by statute or constitutional amendment) is that such proscription actually makes
the act a more effective form of protest. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic:
Idealized Pluralism,Community and Hate Speech, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 371, 406 n.48
(1992).
104 SunmuN, supra note 30, at 78.
105
106

See RicHARD RORY, AcHrEwNG OuR CouNTy (1998). Id. at 133; see also id. at 129 (contrasting "romantic" and "highly professional").
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until the 1960s." 10 7 Beyond historically-based distrust of the courts,
Rorty regards judicial attempts to define human needs or the conditions of human flourishing as illegitimate. 10 8 Because we cannot
achieve objectivity, 10 9 the resolution of what human needs are "can
only be political: one must use democratic institutions and procedures
to conciliate these various needs, and thereby widen the range of consensus about how things are." 1 10
With this last observation, Rorty points us to the fundamental failing of Shiffrin's project. He never provides an account of its legitimacy. Shiffrin offers a substantive construction of the Free Speech
Clause's central meaning and a methodology for adjudicating free
speech issues. Through two books, however, he does not pause to
explain how these prescriptions are legitimate elaborations of constitutional meaning.'
Shiffrin instead extols the results that his reformed judicial doctrine would yield. For those who agree with
107 Id. at 50.
108 Id. at 35.
109 I take Shiffrin to accept this premise. See, e.g., SHIFFRrN, supranote 26, at 91-92
(accepting the argument that truth is socially constructed).
110 RoRTY, supra note 105, at 35.
111 One passage, while not expressly taking up the legitimacy crisis, maybe understood as responsive. In contending that eclecticism, while "wildly capacious," is not
wholly unbounded, Shiffrin asserts, "Judges make decisions in a cultural context that
places some policy arguments beyond the pale." SHIFFRIn, supra note 30, at 137. In
interpreting the Free Speech Clause, judges are bound by "American tradition." Id.
This invocation of tradition is contradicted by his version of romanticism, which expressly prefers "originality," "spontaneity," and "invention" over the "static" and
"bloodless routine." Id. at 141.
He also fails to explain what he means by American tradition or what falls outside
it. Shiffrin's case for dissent demonstrates how little weight he places on notions of
tradition. While he discusses Emerson and Whitman and a few isolated instances of
dissent, he never attempts a rendering of the role dissent has played through American history-not that there is a shortage of material. This has enabled at least one
commentator to question whether the American tradition places a significant value
on dissent at all. See Mark Tushnet, Book Review, The Culture(s) of Free Expression, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1106, 1111-12 (1991). Nor does he attempt to discuss other values
of the American tradition that might supersede the priority that American tradition,
whatever he means by that term, accords it.
One troublesome omission is any reference to the formative debate over the
place of dissent that raged through the bitter and divisive Presidential campaign of
1800. This debate focused on the Alien and Sedition Acts, which criminalized certain
dissent as "seditious libel," and their constitutionality. ThomasJefferson had opposed
them as unconstitutional limitations on the freedom of speech. Jefferson's advocacy,
and his election, are strong evidence that dissent is and long has been an important
component of the freedom of speech. Even Jefferson, however, declined to accord
dissent the status of central or core value of free speech. His inaugural address, for
example, accorded priority to unity and harmony. See The First Inaugural Address
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Shiffrin's agenda, this may be reason enough to accept his doctrinal
prescriptions. 112 For those who do not hold romantic or progressive
commitments, however, Shiffrin gives no reason to accept his doctri114
nal reformations."13 He preaches exclusively to the choir.
(Mar. 4, 1801), reprintedinTHE PORTABLE THOMASJEFFERSON 290 (Merrill D. Peterson
ed., 1975). Jefferson urged,
During the contest of opinion through which we have passed, the animation
of discussion and of exertions has sometimes worn an aspect which might
impose on strangers unused to think freely and to speak and to write what
they think; but this being now decided by vote of the nation according to the
rules of the constitution, all will, of course, arrange themselves under the
will of the law, and unite in common efforts for the common good.... Let
us, then, fellow citizens, unite with one heart and one mind. Let us restore
to social intercourse that harmony and affection without which life itself are
but dreary things.
Id. at 291.
112 For the reasons set forth above, however, even those sympathetic to Shiffrin's
goals will have cause for skepticism. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
113 On the last full page of the book, Shiffrin asserts that his dissent-based model
would also protect "[t]he overwhelming majority of right-wing dissent." SHIFFtN,
supra note 26, at 129. The assertion is dubious. See id. at 145 n.50 ("Democracy might
well be improved, however, if [the Wall Street Journal's] editorial page were to take a
thirty-year vacation."). For example, Shiffrin denies tobacco advertising the status of
fully protected dissent, even though it challenges prevailing conventions, because it
lacks the "prospect of promoting progressive change." Id. at xii (emphasis added).
Shiffrin's disdain, expressed throughout the book, for neutrality makes this foray into
viewpoint neutrality all the more jarring. For the purposes expressed in the text, his
denial is beside the point. Shiffrin propounds the dissent-based model as instrumental to achieving a society that is more just as measured from his romantic and progressive commitments. It is unlikely that even "right-wing dissenters" would accept the
dissent-based model if that is where it would lead. Some right-wing dissenters might
also feel uneasy, and unprotected, in light of Shiffrin's treatment of hate speech. One
is left to wonder further whether Shiffrin would protect protests in front of abortion
clinics. On one view, the protesters are quite powerless-the supreme law of the land
precludes the enactment of their views into law. On another view, the number and
fervor of the protesters may make them seem quite powerful relative to a lone and
harassed women seeking access to the clinic. Ultimately, the powerful interest is the
one the court decides to protect. In this case, the model seems self-defeating.
Moreover, those who are conservative (as opposed to right-wing dissenters) or

whose speech is expressly grounded in appeals to prevailing social norms in order to
defeat non-conforming societal conditions, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a
Dream" speech for example, are denied full protection under the dissent-based
model. Shiffrin is quite candid on this point: "Those who wish to preserve the status
quo, of course, should oppose a dissent-centered theory...." Id. at 129. This statement says something deeper about how Shiffrin regards constitutional doctrine.
One's position on issues of constitutional doctrine should be determined by one's
political position. I take up the implications of this position below.
114 See, e.g., St'rRiN, supra note 26, at 121-30.
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There is an important pragmatic problem with this approach: no
one in Shiffrin's choir is on the Supreme Court. Because it is the
Supreme Court that ultimately must accept Shiffrin's doctrinal reforms, there is no basis for the members of the choir to believe that
Shiffrin's doctrinal vision will foreseeably become reality.11 5 This
shortcoming was evident in Romance,11 6 and Dissent does nothing to
respond to it.
This is no idle criticism, for if Shiffrin were to provide a persuasive account of his project's legitimacy, he would create the basis for
those who disagree with him politically to accept his doctrinal prescriptions. In turn, he would provide those sympathetic to his agenda
reason to believe his project could succeed.
History is illuminating, especially from the standpoint of progressives. The constitutional tradition fell into crisis in the early twentieth
century over judicial response to progressive legislative victories. The
Court used substantive due process as a grounds to invalidate numerous pieces of progressive legislation. Emblematic was the Court's ruling in Lochner v. New York, 1 17 which held unconstitutional a statute
that restricted the number of hours bakery employees could work per
day and per week. The Court's opinion rested on the grounds of substantive due process, which the court understood to prohibit much
regulation of private contracts. The opinion was subject to withering
attack in a dissent by Justice Holmes, who saw the majority as imposing its own policy preferences, derived from the economics of Herbert
Spencer, under the guise of the Due Process Clause.1 1 8 The specific
crisis concerned whether the Court was legitimately interpreting the
Constitution or was exceeding its role and substituting its policy preferences for those of democratic institutions. The crisis came to a
head during the New Deal and was resolved when the Court changed

115 In this, Dissent calls to mind Rorty's criticism of one of the leading contemporary romantics, the playwright Tony Kushner, who "produces dreams... of inexplicable, magical transformations. The cultural Left has contributed to the formation of
this politically useless unconscious." RoRTY, supra note 105, at 102.
116 Mark Tushnet raised exactly this question in a review of Romance. "I want to
say merely, 'Nino Scalia? David Souter? Sandra Day O'Connor?' That is, there is
precious little reason to believe that the people who actually will make the law of the
first amendment will be romantics. Indeed, given the political dynamics of the nomination and confirmation process, the presumption ought to be that romantics will be
systematically screened out." Tushnet, supra note 111, at 1114.
117 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
118 See id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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course and determined that it generally would defer to judgments of
the legislature." 9
The Supreme Court's approach during the Lochner era favored
conservative political and economic interests. Nevertheless, conservatives came to embrace the Court's repudiation of Lochnerbecause they
could not persuasively respond to Holmes's critique. 120 There is thus
reason to expect that, were Shiffrin to provide a persuasive account of
his doctrine's legitimacy, those who do not share his political agenda
could accept it.121
The major preoccupation of constitutional theory for more than
122
twenty years has been the effort to respond to the legitimacy crisis.
It is thus initially surprising that Shiffrin does not take up the matter
of his project's legitimacy as such and that he offers only brief
passages that can be understood as speaking to the question at all.
His inattention to the topic may be an expression of his romanticism.
Any account of his project's legitimacy would require a theory, and
romanticism is resolutely pragmatic. 123 To propound a theory is to
place limits on those qualities that Shiffrin seeks to free. Embracing a
theory would reverse his stated priorities, emphasizing "the general
and the universal" over "the concrete and the particular." 124 Shiffrin
appears to have taken to heart Emerson's aphorism, "The only sin is
25
limitation."'
Shiffrin also seems to takes a dim view of the possibility of legitimacy. He repeatedly regards judges as inevitably acting in result-oriented fashion 2 6 and regards the ultimate basis for assessing legal
119 The exception is set forth in the famous footnote four. See United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

120

See PowELL, supra note 8, at 274.

121 See BORK, supra note 18, at 78 (explaining legitimacy is the central role of
constitutional theory and in turn prevents judges from imposing their own

preferences).
122 Some important entrants in this contest are
FOUNDATIONS

PHILIP

(1991),

PHILIP BOBBIrr,

BOBBrITr, CONSITrUTIONAL FATE

BRUCE ACKERMAN,

WE THE PEOPLE:

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

(1982), and JoHN

(1991),

HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND

DISTRUST (1980).
123 See generally RORTY, supra note 105. Contemporary romantic rejection of theory is vividly portrayed in the work of Tony Kushner. See TONY KusHNER, SLAVsl:
THINKING ABOUT THE LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS OF Vnrux AND HAPPINESS (1996);
ToNY KUSHNER, ANGELS IN AMFacA: A GAY FANTASIA ON NATIONAL THEMES: PEREsTRoncA

(1994); ToNY

KUSHNER, ANGELS IN AMERcA:

A

GAY

FANTASIA ON

NATIONAL

THEMES: THE MILLENNIUM APPROACHES (1993).

124
125

SHIFFRIN, supra note 30, at 141.
ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES 171 (Everyman's Library 1906)

RALPH WALDO EMERSON,

(1941).
126 See, e.g., SHnm-mN, supra note 30, at 98.
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arguments to be whether they meet with one's political preferences. 127 The conclusion to Dissent rests on this view:
The [free speech] principle does not interpret itself. The rightward
drift of argument cannot be understood by searching for an inherent meaning of the free speech principle or even by seeking to assess its political tilt. We would make more progress if we recalled
the name of the chiefjustice of the United States: William H. Rehnquist.... Like it or not, the free speech principle is here to stay.
'Tis better politicalstrategy to claim it than to hold out oneself as an
128
enemy of a cherished right.
But the calculus of whether reforming judicial doctrine "'Tis better political strategy" is quite a bit more complicated. Rorty and many
other progressives have rejected this calculus not only on principle,
but on strategic grounds. Shiffrin's strategy rests on twin premises.
First, the claims he makes in the name of the free speech principle
must have a chance of being adopted. Second, the risk that the judiciary will adopt a doctrine that actually impedes the progressive political
agenda and/or promotes its competitors must be acceptably low.
Shiffrin never offers any reason to believe that the first premise is satisfied. Moreover, history gives ample cause for concern as to the second.1 29 As a matter of strategy, the better course for those who share
Shiffrin's political commitments may be to renounce efforts to reform
1 0
judicial doctrine and to abandon judicial review. 3
III.

ANrTHEsis: ABANDONMENT

Professor Mark Tushnet seeks to preserve constitutionalism by
abandoning the defining institution of the American constitutional
tradition (judicial review) and the constitutional elite (the judges, lawyers, and academics who practice constitutionalism). As he has argued, "[B] oth Enlightenment rationality and common law method
understood as in some way associated with the idea of authenticity,
127
status
128
129

See, e.g., SHIFFRIN, supra note 26, at 129 ("IT]hose who wish to preserve the
quo, of course, should oppose a dissent-centered theory.").
Id. (emphasis added).
See Eric. J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the OriginalismDebate, 15 CONST.

COMM. 411 (1998).

130 Consider Professor Tushnet's "claim that legal rights are essentially individualistic, at least in the United States constitutional and legal culture, and that progressive
change requires undermining the individualism that vindicating legal rights reinforces.... [T] he long-term ideological consequences of winning victories in courts
are almost certainly going to be adverse to progressive change." TUsHNET, supra note
27, at 142. His prescription forms the basis of the next Section.
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have run out."in3 Tushnet is concerned about the Constitution remaining the exclusive province of this elite. Thus, he wants not only
to take the Constitution away from the courts, but to give the Constitution to the democratically accountable branches and, through them,
to the people.
Tushnet offers a provocative argument in support of his proposal
that the Supreme Court no longer exercise judicial review. His argument rests on an important distinction between what he terms the
"thin constitution" and the "thick constitution." The thin constitution
refers to the principles articulated in the Declaration of Independence as well as the Preamble to the Constitution. The thick constitution refers to the operative clauses of the Constitution, the
3 2
Constitution minus the Preamble.
The thin constitution is the province of the public and of their
agents in government. It is, Tushnet contends, the aspirational principles of the thin constitution (such as equality, liberty, and the general
welfare) as opposed to the relatively technical and detailed clauses of
the thick constitution to which public commitment attaches. It is
through this common commitment that the people become "the People." 3 3 Further, it is by discussing and debating the meaning of these
principles in the context of specific governmental actions or omissions that we create our national identity and constitute ourselves as a
people. 3 4 The construction of the thin constitution is a political process. Competing conceptions of its principles are contended for, draw
or fail to draw support, and evolve over time. As a fundamentally
political process, the Court has no direct role, although its interpretations of related provisions in the thick constitution, such as the Equal
Protection Clause, may have some persuasive influence on deliberations regarding the thin constitution.
3 5
Tushnet uses the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford1
to provide an
illustration. The Supreme Court issued an opinion that, read fairly
and fully, put the federal government out of the business of enacting
any significant regulation of slavery. Abraham Lincoln responded by
refusing to embrace the Supreme Court's opinion in all its fullness.
Instead, he accepted only that the decision resolved the dispute between the parties. Lincoln refused to accept that the Supreme Court
131

H. Jefferson Powell on the American Constitutional Tradition: A Conversation, 72

NORE DAME L. REV. 11, 34 (Thomas L. Shaffer &John H. Robinson eds., 1996).
132 This distinction echoes the question raised by Professor Thomas Grey. See
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).

133 See Tusm':r, supra note 27, at 50-52.
134 See id. at 50-51, 181-82.
135 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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could, in effect, adopt a conception of equality that would govem the
political branches. It is for Congress and the President, and the people acting through them, to construe and effectuate the ideals of the
1 36
Declaration of Independence.
Accepting the legitimacy of Lincoln's treatment of the Dred Scott
decision, it does not follow that judicial review is illegitimate. All that
follows is that, at least under certain circumstances, it is proper for the
political branches to challenge the broad application of Supreme
Court precedents. Rather than a comment on judicial review, the furor over Dred Scott speaks to the question of judicial supremacy-the
extent to which the Supreme Court's interpretation of the (thick)
Constitution is binding on the political branches in the future, as opposed to the parties to the specific case in which the interpretation is
announced. 137 Tushnet understands this and pushes on.
The Constitution's design contemplates that the political
branches will deliberate on behalf of the public and subject to public
input and scrutiny. James Madison and other founders expected that
through this exercise in republican self-government we would constitute ourselves as a people and would forge our national identity. He
was, of course, not so naive as to expect that there would be no selfinterested action by members of the political branches. Instead, the
government was divided into branches, and the predominant branch,
Congress, was further divided into two chambers of intentionally different and not entirely compatible character. Each of the branches
would serve as a check against the ambitions of and overreaching by
the others. The Constitution's design rests on the premise that no
particular special interest or faction would likely take control of all the
divisions of power at once and so the structural checks and balances
would provide a sufficient safeguard against oppressive governmental
136 Tushnet recognizes the major counterexample-massive resistance by Southern politicians to the Supreme Court's desegregation orders. Because this resistance
could not plausibly be based on any principle within the thin constitution, Tushnet
considers it illegitimate and distinguishable from Lincoln's response. See TUsHNET,
supra note 27, at 51, 181-82.
137 Tushnet offers a subtle and compelling approach to judicial supremacy, suggesting the circumstances under which it is and is not proper for political leaders to
challenge the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations. While he gives the
book's first chapter the provocative title "Against Judicial Supremacy," his argument
can be just as readily understood as making the case for a nuanced understanding of
judicial supremacy in that it accepts the judiciary's interpretations as supreme in all
but exceptional cases. See id. at 6.
In any event, it is incongruous to encounter a discussion of judicial supremacy
given the book's major proposal. If we take the Constitution away from the courts,
judicial supremacy will fall, afortiori
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action. These structural safeguards would then provide a space within
which effective, deliberative self-government could address whatever
crises might face the new nation in a way that would adhere to the
principles of the thin constitution.
Practice under this system, according to Tushnet, has shown that
judicial review is insidious. It distorts deliberation by both the public
and political leaders by forcing them to focus on what the court
thinks. More importantly, it causes politicians to neglect their role as
constitutionalists. They do not think about whether a given piece of
legislation is consistent with the principles of the thin constitution, or
the thick constitution for that matter, because that is the courts' job.
Political leaders thus avoid making difficult decisions regarding the
138
meaning of these principles, abdicating that role to the courts.
By now, Tushnet has argued that public commitment flows to the
principles of the thin constitution rather than the arcana of the thick
constitution, that the political branches enjoy priority in the development and application of the principles of the thin constitution, and
that the courts are not particularly able at construing these principles.
Why then should the judiciary's interpretations of the thick constitution ever be allowed to trump the considered judgments of the polit139
ical branches as expressed in legislative or executive action?
One important response is that the political branches, in fact, do
a bad job of protecting long-term commitments embodied in the
thick constitution, including the freedoms embodied in the Bill of
Rights, against the political pressures of the moment. Judicial review
is an attempt by "Philip sober to control Philip drunk."140 It was this
concern that led the founding generation to demand a Bill of Rights
complete with judicial review to make those rights meaningful, and
138

See id. at 54-71.

139 By executive action, I mean to encompass the action.of administrative agencies. Tushnet does not discuss where the independent regulatory agencies, such as
the Federal Reserve, fit into his scheme. On the one hand, they are paradigmatically
undemocratic. On the other hand, Congress and the President have agreed that
these entities do not violate any norms found in the thin constitution and that in fact
they promote the general welfare. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935). If they should become tools of oppression, Congress and the
President remain fully able to respond.
140 David J. Brewer, The Nation's Safeguard, Address Before the New York State
Bar Association (Jan. 17, 1893), reprintedin PROCEEDINGS OF THm NEwYoRK STATE BAR
AssOCIATION 37, 45 (1893). This argument has been forcefully put by one i'n a position to know quite well: Abner Mikva, the former chiefjudge of the D.C. Circuit and

former congressman. See Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution?,61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983). For a thoughtful response, see Louis Fisher,
ConstitutionalInterpretationby Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985).
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even Madison came around to the view that a judicially enforceable
Bill of Rights would be an improvement.
Tushnet has a quiver full of arrows to shoot at this common rationale for judicial review. First, he denies that there is an important
tension between long-term commitment and short-term political pressures. 141 The derisive label, "short-term political pressures," masks
what is often the political motive: to secure the general welfare against
a perceived immediate threat. This is a value wholly within the thin
constitution. On this view, the short-term concern is as legitimate as
the long-term commitment. This situation calls for balancing the
commitments of the thin constitution, which is the process by which
we continue to refine our national identity and is not a process that
14 2
should be abdicated to judges.
Second, Tushnet denies that judicial review acts as a significant
restraint on political forces; it amounts to "noise around zero." 143 He
cites approvingly the studies concluding that, over time, the Court's
jurisprudence follows election results. 144 This is to be expected since
the Constitution establishes that federal judges are appointed by the
President subject to confirmation by the Senate.
For proponents of judicial review, Brown v. Board of Educationis a
compelling counterpoint. 145 Drawing on the work of Professor
Michael Klarman, 146 Tushnet topples this sacred cow. A cold look at
the aftermath of Brown reveals that the court's opinion had astonishingly little effect on the segregation of public schools. In 1964, ten
years after Brown, a miniscule percentage of public schools in the
south were desegregated. It was not until political leaders adopted
the view that racial segregation violated the thin constitution's equality principle and enacted legislation to effectuate this view that meaningful progress was made. 1 47 If Brown is judicial review's shining
141 See TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 66-68.
142 With time or abatement of the perceived crisis, of course, the nation may decide to recalibrate the balance. The political process remains available for that purpose as well as for the purpose of instructing political leaders that they have
overreacted. This is one way of understanding the controversy over the Alien and
Sedition Acts and the federal election of 1800. See supra note 111.
143 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 125, 153.
144 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, CouRTs: A COMPARATIVE AND POLmCAL ANALYsIs (1981);
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a NationalPolicyMaker, 6J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
145 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REv. 7 (1994).
147 See id. at 145-46.
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moment, it demonstrates just how little judicial review is capable of
achieving. 48
Tushnet also points out thatjudicial review is not a necessary condition for protecting values such as individual liberty. Other countries, such as Great Britain, have proven just as capable as the United
States at securing values of the sort in our thin constitution without
granting their judiciaries the power to declare laws void as
149
unconstitutional.
This comparative perspective raises a related observation. Even if
it is descriptively accurate to contend that political leaders do not pay
attention to constitutional considerations, 15 0 thick or thin, this may be
due to judicial review. Ifjudges were not standing by to enforce constitutional values, the political branches might be more responsible
when constitutional issues arise. More generally, judicial review leads
legislators and the public to defer to the judiciary as to the meaning of
even the thin Constitution and so their capacity to engage in constitutionalism has atrophied. Tushnet refers to these pernicious effects of
judicial review as the 'Judicial overhang."' 1 Having never inhabited
this universe withoutjudicial review, we cannot know how the political
branches would respond.
148 Tushnet recognizes the symbolic importance of Brown, which energized the
civil rights movement. Nevertheless, he questions whether this was ultimately vital to
the movement's successes. This question is "unanswerable," but "[i]t seems quite
likely that something would have happened in the South without Brown." Id. at 146.
149 Great Britain may not provide much solace. It has increasingly integrated its
legal system with that of the European Union. It has adopted the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, along with judicial review.
150 The description is disputable. Compare Miah.AEL J. GERHARDT, TiE FaD.RAL
IMP.ACHMENTr PRocEss: A CoNsrrrUTIoNAL AND HIsTroiucA, ANALYsis 13-14 (1996)
(stating that Congress generally does a creditable job of constitutionalism in the context of impeachment), with MichaelJ. Klarman, ConstitutionalFetishism and the Clinton

Impeachment Debate,85 VA. L. REV. 631 (1999) (arguing that Congress did a terriblejob
of constitutionalism during the impeachment and trial of President Clinton). The

constitutional opinions of the Attorneys General and the Office of Legal Counsel
stand as testimony to the executive branch's attempt to engage in constitutional interpretations and to abide by those interpretations. See generally H. JEFFERSON POWELL,
Ti CONSITrMON AND THE ATroRNEYs GENERAL (1999).

151

See TusHNET, supra note 27, at 57-65. The prospect of lifting the judicial over-

hang leaves Tushnet almost giddy. He speculates that "[f]reed of concerns about
judicial review, we might also be able to develop a more robust understanding of

constitutional social welfare rights." Id. at 169. These would include the right "to
employment, to housing, to a minimally decent standard of living, and the like." Id.
To paraphrase Tushnet's rhetorical question to Shiffrin, I want simply to ask, Trent
Lott? Dick Armey? Tom DeLay? See supra note 116.
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Tushnet makes an affirmative case for political construction. He
argues that the Constitution's structure actually lends support to the
notion that the political branches will do a good job of constitutional
interpretation. This is because the Constitution's structure is incentive compatible. We do not need judicial scrutiny of the arrangements that the political branches make because the Constitution
structures the incentives of political actors in a way that will lead them
to comply with the Constitution. Since the incentives run toward constitutional compliance, we can safely consider the Constitution to be
152
self-enforcing.
Because the Constitution is self-enforcing, it is safe to take the
Constitution away from the courts. Freed from the judicial overhang,
wide-ranging public discussion of the Constitution will be possible and
democratically accountable branches of government will be able to
construe the Constitution and effectuate their constitutional judgments. Through this continuing process of populist constitutional
law, the people construct the national identity; the people thus be15 3
come "the People."
At the level of generality at which Tushnet makes his proposal, it
is bold and elegant. Considering how the proposal might work, however, raises difficult questions. First, how do we know when a political
actor is engaging in populist constitutional law? Tushnet clearly believes, for example, that populist constitutionalism would entail legislative deliberation different from that which we observe in Congress,
suffering under the judicial overhang. Populist constitutional law is
"law oriented to realizing the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's preamble . . . [and] committed to
universal human rights justifiable by reason in the service of self-government."1 5 4 Tushnet's use of "reason" is very strange. He does not
tell us what he means by reason, although we have seen that he believes that "enlightenment rationality has run its course." 155
A populist constitutionalist would, according to Tushnet, make
an "all-things-considered judgment" about what would "establish Jus152

Tushnet analogizes to car dealerships. A car dealership does not scrutinize the

actions of its sales staff to see whether salespeople are giving maximum effort to sell
cars. Instead, it makes each salesperson's compensation depend on how many cars he
or she sells. The commission-based incentive structure ensures that the dealership's
interest and the salesperson's interest are the same, selling as many cars as possible.
This identity of interest renders the arrangement self-enforcing and obviates any
need for meddling scrutiny. TusHNET, supra note 27, at 95-96.

153 See id. at 50-53, 181-82.
154 Id. at 181.
155

See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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tice, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ... posterity within a framework committed to the principles of
equality and inalienable rights embodied within the Declaration of Independence." 15 6 This may have been precisely what Governor Orval
Faubus thought he was doing when he attempted to block desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock. Tushnet declares that
Faubus's position was wrong as a construction of the thin constitution,
as indeed it was. 157 But nothing in the preceding paragraphs allows us
to declare Faubus's all-things-considered judgment "wrong." All we
can say is that we disagree. Tushnet's regime allows us to conclude
that Faubus's position was wrong only because Faubus lost. Had his
position prevailed, he would have been, from the standpoint of populist constitutional law, right. There is obvious cause to be skeptical
whether such victor's constitutionalism would inspire conscientious
adherence to principle. 158
This mirrors the problem that doctrinal reform encounters: how
does the thin constitution meaningfully constrain or guide the individuals and institutions charged with engaging in populist constitutional law? An absence of constraint does not create a legitimacy crisis
in populist constitutional law because populist constitutionalism is not
anti-democratic. It may give rise to a crisis nevertheless. If the thin
constitution yields no constraint, then it means whatever those engaged in populist constitutionalism say it means. At this point, one is
left to ask what remains of the Constitution, thick or thin? It is not
obviously more than an incantation that must be invoked before political actors call upon their powers.
Tushnet also regards taking the Constitution away from the
courts to be an anti-elitist move. This seems erroneous. Once the
Constitution is taken away from the courts, the political branches (especially Congress) become the institutions primarily charged with
conducting constitutionalism. Members of Congress are accountable
in that they can be voted out of office. But they are not effectively less
elitist because they are far less accessible to individuals than are the
courts. By filing a lawsuit, an individual with a constitutional griev156

Id. at 51-52.

157

Tushnet actually labels Faubus's position "implausible." Id. at 14 ("Governor

Faubus could not plausibly have claimed that his actions advanced the Declarations'
project.") Throughout the book, however, he frames the resolution of thin constitutional questions in terms of right and wrong. For example, he repeatedly asks
whether the courts are more likely than Congress to yield right answers.
158 See id. at 66-67 (discussing hypothetical counterterrorism legislation in a way

that seems to endorse the view that whatever position prevails is correct, at least at the
time it prevails).
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ance will receive a forum with considerable process and opportunity
to be heard and considered. Indeed, the courts lend their name to
the common phrase for a fair opportunity to be heard and to have
one's arguments considered; such is to "have one's day in court." A
person with a constitutional grievance who files a petition with Congress, however, has no rational basis for expecting to receive anything
like his or her day in court. Tushnet's proposal in fact changes one
elite (the courts) for another (Congress).159
The world on which populist constitutional law would operate,
moreover, is so complicated that Tushnet cannot make a persuasive
case for a complete elimination of judicial review. These seemingly
unavoidable exceptions may overwhelm Tushnet's proposal. I plan to
explore five exceptions.
First, meaningful participation in the political process is a necessary condition to populist constitutional law, yet, as history bears out,
the political process cannot guarantee such participation. Tushnet accepts that, ideally, judicial review would be available for cases of exclusion from political participation. Nevertheless, Tushnet rejects
judicial review for such cases because "we are likely to get judicial review that is really small, dealing only with formal exclusions and pariah groups, or really big, dealing with informal exclusions resulting
from economic circumstances."1 60 Tushnet believes that politics empowers even discrete and insular minorities because minority groups
can band together with other groups and become a necessary component of a majority bloc. Regarding African-Americans specifically,
Tushnet observes that "[b]y becoming a core constituency in the New
Deal and Great Society political coalitions, African-Americans have
been able to obtain a fair amount of the legislation they sought."1 6 1
This paints far too simple a picture. African-Americans did not
secure "legislation they sought" simply by exercising the vote as members of a coalition. African-Americans participated heroically in the
political process by speaking, protesting, marching, petitioning the
government, and organizing, among other means. All of these forms
of participation were necessary to securing legislation. More to the
159 Rather than making constitutionalism less elitist, Tushnet's proposal would
likely render constitutional participation a collective rather than an individual activity.
Because individuals typically cannot expect to receive the attention of Congress, they
must band together into interest groups in order for their positions to be heard and
acted upon by Congress. This is preferable, Tushnet believes, because collective action is conducive to progressive reforms, where individual action is inimical to them.
See id. at 142.
160 Id. at 160.
161 Id. at 159.
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point, these forms of participation are preconditions to populist constitutional law. The civil rights movement sought to bring about an
understanding of the principles of the thin constitution. The political
process would not have allowed the civil rights movement a full and
fair opportunity to make its case. It was judicial review that secured
the rights of meaningful participation that are a necessary precondition to populist constitutional law.
In this context, Tushnet's treatment of Brown is interesting. That
case is undeniably important, perhaps talismanically so, to proponents
of judicial review. Pointing out that Brown did very little to bring
about school desegregation, however, does nothing to minimize the
central role that the Court's legions of civil rights decisions played in
securing the ability of African-Americans and proponents of civil
rights generally to exercise fundamental rights of political participation other than voting. Without these decisions, it is impossible to
imagine meaningful legislative successes. Consider two examples.
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,162 Alabama made a discovery request during an injunction proceeding that the NAACP disclose
the names and addresses of all members residing in Alabama. The
trial court ordered the NAACP to divulge the information. Fearing
for the safety of its members, the NAACP refused. The court held the
NAACP in contempt and fined it $100,000. The Supreme Court of
the United States held that the order to divulge the membership information was unconstitutional as a violation of the right of association. Had the order been upheld, the NAACP would have faced an
impossible choice: either continue to defy this and other court orders
and be fined into bankruptcy or comply and be harassed into
submission.
In New York Times v. Sullivan,163 the Alabama Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, sued the New York Times for libel on the
basis of an ad the paper had printed. The ad was an open letter
signed by prominent civil rights leaders and celebrities involved in the
movement describing some of the abuses committed by Alabama law
enforcement authorities against civil rights protesters. Sullivan cited a
number of factual errors, each trivial, that he claimed had defamed
him. The Alabama state trial court entered the jury's verdict awarding
Sullivan over $500,000. The Supreme Court held the verdict unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment right of free speech
in a landmark opinion establishing a very high burden on public offi162
163

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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cials who sue for defamation. According to Anthony Lewis, the ver64
dict threatened to bankrupt the newspaper.'
I do not mean to ignore the many other cases where the judiciary
protected a specific march, rally, speech, or boycott, or where it protected an individual as opposed to a group or corporation. Without
organizations like the NAACP, whose very existence was at stake, and
without searching national coverage of the civil fights movement,
which was in jeopardy had the Supreme Court not ruled as it did in
New York Times, political participation in the sense necessary for populist constitutional law would have been lacking. Tushnet fails to present any discussion of how we can be confident of having come
165
through the civil rights struggle without judicial review.
A second exception is quite a bit narrower. Tushnet's account of
the Constitution's structure cannot explain why judicial review is unnecessary for separation of powers controversies where the branch encroached upon is the judiciary, rather than the President or Congress.
Indeed, when fully fleshed out, his account of structure appears to
demand judicial review in this circumstance.
First, it bears emphasizing that eliminating judicial review would
not mean eliminating the judicial power. The federal courts, for example, would still resolve diversity controversies 66 as well as those that
properly raise a federal question. 167 In doing so, the courts could not
decline to enforce a law because it is unconstitutional. They would
still interpret and apply state and federal law to the cases and contro164 See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULvLpArCASE AND THE FmsT AMENDMENT (1991); Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to
the "Central Meaning of the FirstAmendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1983).
165 At the outset of his abbreviated consideration of this issue, he contends that
"presenting the argument in all its glory would be extraordinarily tedious." TUSHNET,
supra note 27, at 158. On the contrary, the demonstration thatjudicial review was not
necessary to achieving the basics of political participation during the civil rights movement would be extraordinarily riveting. Perhaps Tushnet believes that, in the absence
of judicial review, Congress would have responded. This is not obvious, however.
Even if there had been a clear majority in each house to statutorily reverse the state
court rulings, and the President agreed, the availability of filibuster in the Senate and
the power of Southern committee chairmen in the House, most notably Chairman

Howard Smith of the Rules Committee, would have been formidable obstacles to legislative response. See generally CHARLES WAEN & BARBARA WHALEN, Ti LONGEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CML RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 (1985). Moreover,
if judicial review amounts to "noise around zero," as Tushnet elsewhere argues,
TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 153, what is the harm in keeping this security blanket?

166 See 28 U.S.C § 1332 (1994).
167 See id. § 1331 (1994). Tushnet's proposal would also leave the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction intact.
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versies brought before them. Tushnet's proposal leaves a vital role for
the federal judiciary.
The Constitution does not draw bright-line boundaries between
the branches. As Madison explained in The Federalist,such "parchment barriers" would prove no security against encroachment in practice. 16 Instead, the Constitution assumes that each branch will be
vigilant against encroachments by the others and equips each branch
with the means to defend itself against encroachments. 169 As we have
seen, Tushnet bases his proposal on this component of the Constitution's structure.
If the judiciary is deprived of the power of judicial review, however, it has no other constitutional power to resist the encroachments
of the political branches. The political process can offer some protection for the judiciary, as the rejection of President Franklin
Roosevelt's court-packing plan showed. 7 0 Nevertheless, Madison's
theory would anticipate that the political branches would periodically
band together in order to take control of the judicial power, and experience has demonstrated that concern. By 1791 the federal courts
refused to adjudicate claims for federal invalid pensions because judicial decisions were subject to suspension by the Secretary of War and
to revision by Congress. Recognizing this as an attempt by the political branches to exercise the judicial power, the Supreme Court's
judgment in Haybum's Case17 1 is understood to establish that the polit72
ical branches may not review the judicial decisions of the courts.
This is no antiquated aberration. From time to time throughout our
history, Congress and the President have sought to exercise the judicial power. More recently, Congress disagreed with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the statute of limitations for securities fraud
under Rule lOb-5. Congress passed and the President signed a statute
expanding the limitations period for such claims and applied the expansion retroactively, even to cases that had been finally adjudicated.
Thus, the statute reopened final judgments. The Supreme Court
used its power ofjudicial review to strike down the statute and protect
168 Tim FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
169 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
170 On the Court-packing plan, see generally WILimM E. LEUcHTENBURG, THE
SuPREME COURT REBORN: Tim CONsTrrtmoNAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT

(1995).
171 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
172 See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948).
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itself from what it perceived to be a significant encroachment on the
1 73
judicial power by the political branches.
Tushnet may be correct that judicial review is unnecessary to safeguard against encroachments by the President and Congress on one
another, but Madison's theory of checks and balances (to which
Tushnet subscribes) and practice demonstrate that judicial review is
necessary to safeguard the judiciary against encroachments. 17 4 Without the power ofjudicial review in this category of cases-those where
one or both of the political branches encroach upon the courts-the
judiciary ceases to be a coequal branch. At this point, it no longer has
"the constitutional means .

.

.

to resist encroachments of the

others."'1 75

If we are to preserve the theory underlying the design of
checks and balances, as Tushnet claims to do, then judicial review
17 6
must be available to allow the courts to protect themselves.
The third exception involves the common law.' 77 Tushnet would
eliminate judicial review in order to allow the political branches to
enact laws based on their judgments about the substance and scope of
the principles of the thin constitution. This tells us nothing of what to
do when the source of law is not the political branches, but the courts
173 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
174 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("Were the power ofjudging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control for the judge would then be the
legislator." (quoting Montesquieu)).
175 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 169, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). The elided portion of the quote reads, "and personal motives."
The judiciary would presumably retain these, but without the ability to effectuate
them.
176 The judiciary's track record using judicial review in this area has been overwhelmingly encouraging. In the main, it has allowed the political branches to determine how best to structure the judiciary and to experiment with alternative forms of
adjudication. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Commodity
Futures Trading Corp. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
177 By common law, I mean to refer to any rule of law created by a court, the
substance of which is not clearly suggested by the Constitution, a legislative enactment, or a valid administrative rule or regulation. This definition is generalized from
Professor Martha Field's definition of federal common law. See Martha A. Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope ofFederal Common Law, 99 HARv.L. REv. 881,890 (1986). This
definition excludes Bivens actions, causes of action for money damages brought directly under the Constitution-without congressional authorization-against federal
officials who violate federal rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Tushnet does not consider this class of
cases directly, but it seems fairly implicit in his proposal that it is improper for the
courts to recognize such causes of action without authorization from the political
branches.
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themselves. It is hornbook law that "[t]here is no federal general
common law." 178 That, of course, is not to say that there is no federal
common law. 179 Even if Tushnet were to abolish federal common law,
diversity jurisdiction would bring questions of state common law to
the federal courts. As nothing in Tushnet's proposal advocates the
elimination of diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts will continue to
hear common law cases.
As long as the federal courts continue to hear common law cases,
they will unavoidably face questions of constitutional law. First, lawsuits will inevitably raise the question of whether a given rule or application of common law violates the Constitution-for example,
whether the standard of proof in a libel action is lower than the First
Amendment allows,' 8 0 or whether a particular award of punitive damages is so high and arbitrary as to violate the Due Process Clause. 18 1 It
is not clear from Tushnet's presentation whether the courts should
decide these claims. On the one hand, state and federal common law
can be understood as implicitly authorized by the political branches.
If the political branches of the relevant jurisdiction disapprove of a
given rule of common law, they can repudiate or revise it by ordinary
legislation. On this understanding, common law rules should be understood as standing on the same footing as statutory law and the
courts should not exercise judicial review to determine whether the
rule of common law is constitutional. On the other hand, the persistence of a rule of common law may not represent political assent. The
constitutional structure of state and federal governments alike places
obstacles in the path of action. Thus, a rule of common law may owe
its vitality not to the considered assent of the political branches but to
either their failure to consider the matter at all, or to the inability of
an actual majority to overcome the obstacles to legislating a repudiation or revision of the rule. On this understanding, there is nothing
in Tushnet's thesis that would require the courts to refrain from exer-

178 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
179 For some examples, see Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988),
and D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FederalDeposit Insurance Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942).

180 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
181 See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). This case actually involved a statute
that had codified the common law. Such a situation and one involving uncodified

common law present similar questions. Cf. THE

FEDERAUST

No. 37, at 228 (James

Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the obscurity of the boundary between statutory and common law).
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cising judicial review. Indeed, in one articulation of his proposal, he
2
limits its scope to statutory law.' 8
Whether judicial review is proper with respect to existing rules of
common law, the courts cannot avoid interpreting the Constitution
where they face questions of first impression. In this setting, a court is
called upon to decide what the rule of common law will be.183 Imagine a situation where there are two possible rules and one is plainly
unconstitutional while the other just as plainly complies with the Constitution. There is nothing to be gained by instructing the judiciary to
pick between the two rules without regard to the Constitution.
A related exception deals with statutory law. Federal and state
statutes are often, perhaps inevitably, ambiguous. Resolving these ambiguities bears a strong similarity to developing and applying the common law.184 Not unsurprisingly, the courts often face a circumstance
where one or more of several competing reasonable interpretations of
a statute would be unconstitutional or, to use the judicial euphemism
for unconstitutionality, would raise a serious constitutional question.
It is a well established canon of statutory construction that, if fairly
possible, a court will adopt the interpretation that avoids the serious
constitutional question. 18 5 Applying this canon requires the court to
determine whether a given construction would be unconstitutional or
182 Tushnet hypothesizes that the Supreme Court might declare, "[W]e will no
longer invalidate statutes, state or federal, on the ground that they violate the Constitution." TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 154.
183 This will be the case whether the court formulates the issue as a matter of
interpreting existing common law or creating a new rule within an existing body of
common law.
184 For an important argument that statutory interpretation should not resemble
common law decision making, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION
(1997).
185 For a particularly attenuated reading of a statute in order to avoid a serious
constitutional question, see Public Citizen v. Department ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
In separation of powers and federalism cases the Court often invokes a clear statement rule, holding that it will not construe a generally worded statute to apply to the
President or to state judges, for example, unless the statute plainly and specifically
expresses this application. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992)
(holding that the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to the President);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act does not apply to state courtjudges). Professor Frederick Schauer
has criticized avoidance canons because they are often used to reach a construction
that is contrary to the intention of those who enacted the law and thus is not obviously
less offensive to majoritarian principles than judicial review is thought to be. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 71. Schauer makes this argument against the backdrop of commitment to judicial review and to a strong version
ofjudicial supremacy. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation,110 HARV. L. Rev. 1359 (1997).
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would raise a serious constitutional question. If the courts abandon
this avoidance canon along with judicial review, then they may arrive
at interpretations that violate the Constitution, even though the statute itself was ambiguous and did not reflect ajudgment by the political branches that the particular interpretation represents a proper
effectuation of the substantive principles of the thin constitution.
Of course, Congress can overturn by ordinary legislation any statutory interpretation. Thus, if the court's interpretation, in the judgment of the political branches, violates the Constitution, the political
branches can enact corrective legislation. This contention, however,
runs into the same concern highlighted with respect to common law
interpretation. The political branches can be prevented from reacting, or enacting, by factors other than agreement with the court's interpretation. The committee system, procedural rules, and filibuster
can all be deployed to prevent the considered judgment of a strong
majority within the political branches that a given statutory construction is unconstitutional. Given that these factors could cement in
place unconstitutional decisions, it would be intolerable to instruct
the judiciary to construe statutes without regard for whether a given
interpretation would violate the Constitution.
Finally, judicial review must be available in the context of actions
by subordinate officials that do not clearly and directly effectuate the
statutorily enacted determinations of politically accountable officials
or institutions. A leading example is law enforcement activities. Federal law enforcement officials operate under extremely broad grants
of authority to investigate specified violations of the law. 18 6 These officials thus enjoy very broad latitude in selecting targets for investigation and in conducting the investigation. In exercising this discretion
outside the clear and express commands of a statute, they operate
without the specific and considered judgment of the political
branches as to whether a given exercise of law enforcement discretion
is unconstitutional. So, for example, a police officer may be generally
authorized to pull over drivers who violate traffic regulations, but the
law will not, and cannot, codify all of the factors the officer is to con187
sider when deciding whether to exercise that discretion.
These judgments, such as whether there is probable cause for a
search, can directly implicate the Constitution, as well as thin constitu186 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 535(a) (1994) ("The Attorney General and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation may investigate any violation of Title 18 involving Government officers and employees.").
187 There has been a great deal of attention paid recently to the use of race as a
factor in law enforcement decisions. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND
Tm LAiW (1997).
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tional principles. Yet there will have been no occasion for a populist
constitutional law determination of whether the action is or is not
constitutional. This problem is not limited to the actions of police.
Discretion inheres in all executive and administrative action. It would
also be preposterous to imagine that a legislature could so thoroughly
anticipate and codify every possible circumstance in advance and so
render all executive and administrative action ministerial. From its
first session on, Congress has delegated authority and discretion to
the executive branch to deal with contingencies. This approach is reflected in legislation on subjects as diverse as regulation of securities,
the environment, the banking industry, agriculture, funding for the
arts and sciences, and the administration of welfare programs. Even
copiously codified subjects, such as federal income tax, are effectuated only through additional executive discretion. If we are to have
an effective government,1 8 8 Congress must retain the ability to legislate broadly and leave enforcement and administrative discretion to
the executive branch. But there must also be some mechanism for
ensuring that this discretion is exercised within the bounds of the
Constitution. In other words, there must be judicial review of executive and administrative action.
Tushnet recognizes this problem. He suggests that the courts
borrow from European countries, such as Great Britain and the
Netherlands, a vigorous doctrine of ultra vires. Under this doctrine,
the courts strictly construe statutory grants of authority and invalidate
any act beyond the narrow bounds of the granted authority. Instead
of ruling that a search violates the Fourth Amendment, a court could
rule that the officer lacked statutory authority to conduct the search.
It is not at all clear that this suggestion does more than pour the
old wine of constitutional law into a new skin. As Tushnet puts it, "A
great deal of what we in the United States know as constitutional law
parades in Great Britain as . . . a reasonably robust law of ultra

vires."18 9 As was the case with statutory interpretation, the application
of an ultra vires doctrine may depend on constitutional interpretation
by the judiciary. 190 When will the Court regard an FBI agent to have
188 This is a value that itself falls within the thin constitution by virtue of its embrace of the Constitution's Preamble, and so, of promoting the general welfare.
189 TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 163.
190 The Supreme Court has declared that ultra vires acts are not necessarily unconstitutional. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). This seems plainly wrong.
The Constitution's structure establishes that the federal government is one of limited
and enumerated powers. As a corollary, all official federal acts must be authorized by
the Constitution, a treaty, or a statute. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952). The major source of executive and administrative authority is
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acted beyond his or her statutory authority to conduct a search? One
possible answer is when that search violated the Fourth Amendment.
Why should we want to construct this facade? Tushnet's implicit
response appears to be that by changing the label, we would free
those engaged in populist constitutional law-the public and the
political branches-from the distorting effects that judicial pronouncements about the Constitution inevitably have. But it is not obvious that the public and the political branches would be so easily
fooled. Moreover, even an ultra vires doctrine that perfectly tracks
constitutional protections would work one significant change from
the current system of judicial review. The change would be undesirable and, judging from the presentation in the book, unintended.
Federal courts would no longer be able to review the actions of state
law enforcement officers. The doctrine of ultra vires looks to whether
an official act is authorized by law. In the case of state law enforcement action, this is a question of state statutory law. Lacking a federal
question, direct appeal to the Supreme Court is unavailable. For the
same reason, the federal courts would not be available for a collateral
attack. 19 1
In fairness, Tushnet intends the shift to an ultra vires approach to
accomplish more than merely relabeling judicial review. He means
for the courts to construe grants of authority narrowly apparently
without regard to constitutional considerations. Applied this way, the
doctrine becomes pernicious. An aggressive doctrine of ultra vires requires the legislature to contemplate in advance all of the possible
decisions that might confront a government official and to define precisely how that official is to act. This is simply not a feasible or effective way to run a federal government. As such, it would undermine
the values of populist constitutionalism by diminishing the ability of
the democratic branches from effectuating their conscientious
judgments.

statute. Whenever a federal official acts without authority, then, the official violates

the Constitution. In the typical case of acting without statutory authority, the official
violates the separation of powers by invoking federal power that only Congress, subject to presidential veto, can bring into existence. If, as erroneously asserted in Dalton, the President acts beyond his statutory authority, he not only encroaches on the
legislative power, he would appear to violate his duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, see U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 3, even under the narrowest construction
of this provision. See Christopher N. May, PresidentialDefiance of "Unconstitutional"

Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative,21 HASINGS CONST. L.Q. 865 (1994).
191 The federal courts may grant a writ of habeas corpus, for example, only where
there is a violation of the Constitution or federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
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This form of the ultra vires doctrine is a terribly blunt instrument.
It requires the courts to strike down broad categories of activities or
none at all. In this case, the more likely consequence of a shift from
judicial review to a doctrine of ultra vires is that the doctrine would be
rarely invoked and Tushnet's promise of protection would
192
evaporate.
If we accept populist constitutional law, we accept that the public-by and through its elected representatives in Congress and the
President, and their state counterparts-engages in constitutional interpretation and the court should not strike down the actions of those
political leaders. The last three exceptions to judicial review-for
common law decisions, statutory interpretation, and administrative
and executive action-all deal with a common problem with
Tushnet's proposal. In each of these cases, governmental power is
exercised by an actor outside the framework of populist constitutional
law: the judiciary and subordinate executive and administrative officials. While it follows from Tushnet's case for populist constitutional
law that judicial review should not be exercised to strike down a federal or state statute, it does not follow that judicial review of these
other categories of governmental action is inappropriate. Because the
decisions and actions of these political officials are not "incentive
compatible," Tushnet's own theory does not justify eliminating judicial review for these categories. 19 3 As I have attempted to show, often
on the basis of Tushnet's own reasoning, extending the repudiation of
judicial review to these categories carries tremendous costs and risks,
for it would lack the political safeguards that operate against the President and Congress.
Tushnet regards, with some justification, judicial review as a cancer on our politics. Remove the overbearing specter of how the judiciary interprets the Constitution and people will be free to think for
themselves about the meaning of fundamental values like equality and
liberty. Eliminate judicial review and political leaders will be required
to act more responsibly, no longer able to abdicate to the judiciary the
duty to consider whether legislation violates constitutional principles.
But judicial review is deeply and firmly entrenched and, as I have suggested, Tushnet's book fails to offer a justification for eradicating it
entirely. Even if judicial review is restricted to the five categories I
have described, the judiciary's constitutional interpretations will con192 This may be contributing to Britain's move to judicial review. See supra note
149.
193 Tushnet seems to accept this conclusion, although he regards "the question to
be quite close." TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 47.
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tinue to be a significant factor in American politics and to exert a
powerful influence over the public and legislators.
IV.

SYNTHsis: THE PROGRESSIVE CHALLENGE

Professor Shiffrin's work seems to be driven by an abiding faith
that the Supreme Court plays an important and worthy role in the
American system of government and in American constitutionalism.
The inability of Professor Tushnet's model to justify taking the Constitution away from the courts is a significant vindication of Shiffrin's
faith. As we saw in connection with Shiffrin's project, the challenge
for progressives is to develop an account of the legitimacy of judicial
review.
There is reason to be pessimistic about the prospects for resolving
the legitimacy crisis. 194 But there are also reasons to be optimistic.
First, there is no convincing rationale for eliminating judicial review.
Second, there appears to be strong public and political support for
judicial review. This was evident in the repudiation of attempts, led by
House Majority Whip Tom DeLay, to impeach and remove four
judges who had issued rulings that troubled political conservatives.
The initiative was widely seen as threatening the independence of the
judiciary, which is to say that the political branches might exercise
control over the judicial interpretation of the Constitution. The emphatic repudiation of Representative DeLay's proposal, including opposition from members of his own party,195 demonstrate continuing
support for the role of the judiciary in the American constitutional
tradition. This event is analogous to, though not nearly so significant
as, the repudiation of President Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing
plan. A political official, acting during a time when the legitimacy of
judicial review was subject to serious challenge, sought to divert control over constitutional interpretation to the political branches. The
failure of each attempt confirms, albeit probably to differing degrees, 196 public support for preserving judicial review within the constitutional tradition.
194 See PowELL, supra note 8, at 292 (arguing that constitutionalism, as a tradition
of rational inquiry, "seems fatally stricken").

195 See Stephen 0. Kline, JudicialIndependence: Rebuffing CongressionalAttacks on the
Third Branch, 87 Ky. L.J. 679, 721 (1998-99) (citing opposition of House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde).
196 The court-packing plan had a much higher profile than Representative DeLay's court-unpacking plan. In part, this stems from the former having been made by
the President of the United States, even as powerful a member of Congress as Congressman DeLay cannot command the public eye as does the President. The courtpacking plan also came in the context of an important and widely followed political
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As I stated in the Introduction, I do not propose to solve the legitimacy crisis. Nevertheless, Professor Tushnet's book gives some indication of how judicial review would look should the crisis be resolved.
It would seem that the greatest hope for establishing the legitimacy of
judicial review is in the areas where its illegitimacy cannot be persuasively established. If so, post-crisis judicial review would accord broad
deference to the judgments and actions of government officials and
institutions except (at least) in the five instances discussed above
where Tushnet has not established the illegitimacy ofjudicial constitutional interpretation. 1 9 7 If so, then, much as the legitimacy crisis resembles the Lochner crisis, the resolution of the legitimacy crisis will
resemble the resolution of the Lochner crisis.
This version of judicial review may not leave all progressives
overjoyed. The scope of judicial constitutional interpretation would
be quite limited and would preclude the sort of victories progressives
won during the interval from Eisenstadt v. Baird'98 until the Rehnquist
Court. As Richard Rorty demonstrates, many progressives prefer a
narrowly limited scope of judicial review.' 99 Moreover, even this limited version of judicial review would offer important protections for
participation in the political process. As Professor Shiffrin notes,
progressives rely upon grassroots and large-scale public mobilization.
Such protections would be vital to progressives, just as they were dur20 0
ing the civil rights movement.
The legitimacy crisis is a grave threat to the tradition of American
constitutionalism. There is reason to believe that the crisis may be
resolved. There is also reason to hope that it is.

crisis over how to respond to the Great Depression. Roosevelt was responding to the
Court's invalidation of the central features of the New Deal. The DeLay plan involved

at least one judge who had ruled on a prominent law, the California Civil Rights
Initiative. But this law cannot be compared to the New Deal legislation in terms of
public awareness or interest. See generally Kline, supra note 195.
197 See supra notes 157-90 and accompanying text. I do not contend that the five
categories discussed in the previous Section are the only categories that could survive
the legitimacy crisis.
198 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
199 See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (discussing New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449

(1958)).

